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The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to U.C.A. 
§78-2a-3(2)(C), inasmuch as it is an appeal from a juvenile court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does the State lack jurisdiction to prosecute the Defendant? Jurisdiction is a 
question of law, subject to a correction of error standard, and according no particular 
deference to the trial court. Skokos v. Corradini 900 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App. 1995); 
State v. Gomez, 63 P.3d 72 (Utah 2002). This issue was briefed in the trial court, 118-
154, 60-82, and was the subject of a pretrial ruling. 32 
INCLUDED ISSUES. All of the issues set forth below pertain to the question of 
jurisdiction. As sub-issues of the issue of jurisdiction, all of the issues present questions 
of law, subject to the standard of appellate review set forth above. All were included in 
the briefing cited above. 
a. Is the court bound by federal law? 
b. Is federal jurisdiction over Indian lands exclusive? 
i. Did the alleged offense take place in Indian country? 
ii. Was the victim of the alleged offense an Indian tribe? 
c. Does the State have jurisdiction over the conduct in question? 
i. Are hunting and fishing rights of Indian sovereignty? 
2 
ii. Can hunting and fishing rights be exercised without enrollment in a 
federally recognized tribe? 
iii. Does the Uintah Band possess vested treaty rights? 
iv. Is the Uintah Band a separate and independent entity? 
v. Do Indian tribes determine their own membership criteria? 
d. Does the Ute Partition Act have any effect on vested treaty rights? 
i. Is the effect of the UPA limited to federal benefits? 
ii. Are indivisible assets exempted from the operation of the UPA?. 
iii. Are hunting and fishing rights an indivisible asset? 
iv. Does the UPA confer any jurisdiction upon the State over hunting and 
fishing on Indian lands? 
v. Can termination be imputed to persons not included on the termination 
roll? 
vi. Does the UPA have any effect on the separate assets of the Uintah 
Band? 
vii. Does the trial court have jurisdiction to interpret the UPA? 
viii. Is the UPA constitutional? 
a. Does the UPA violate the Equal Protection clause of the XIVth 
Amendment? 
3 
b. Is the UPA a covert attempt to eliminate all Indian rights in the 
Uintah Basin? 
2. Did the Court deny Defendant due process of law by excluding evidence of 
reasonable reliance upon a published court ruling? Reasonable reliance is a question of 
statutory interpretation, subject to a correction of error standard, and according no 
particular deference to the trial court. State v. Bluff, 52 P.3d 1210 (Utah 2002), cert 
denied 537 U.S. 1172, 123 S.Ct 999, 154 L.Ed.2d 914. This issue was briefed in the trial 
court, 118-154, 60-82, and was the subject of a pretrial ruling. 32 
3. Did the Court err by denying Defendant the defense of Infancy? The 
applicability of a proposed defense is a question of statutory interpretation, subject to a 
correction of error standard, and according no particular deference to the trial court. State 
v. Daniels, 40 P.3d 611 (Utah 2002). This issue was briefed in the trial court, 118-154, 
60-82, and was the subject of a pretrial ruling. 32 
INCLUDED ISSUES. All of the issues set forth below pertain to the question of 
reasonable reliance. All of the issues present questions of law, subject to the standard of 
appellate review set forth above. Case citations refer to determinative statutes, rules, and 
cases. 
a. Did the Court err by failing to presume the Defendant incompetent to commit a 
crime? 
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b. Did the Court err by not requiring the State to overcome the presumption of 
incompetence? 
4. Is U.C.A. §78-3a-117(4) unconstitutional? The constitutionality of a statute is a 
question of law, which an appellate court reviews for correctness. This issue was briefed 
in the trial court, 118-154, 60-82, and was the subject of a pretrial ruling. 32 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article VI, Section 2, United States Constitution 
Vth Amendment, United States Constitution 
XIVth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article I, Section 3, Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution 
Article III, Section 2, Utah Constitution 
25 U.S.C. §677-677aa 
25U.S.C. §1321 
25 U.S.C. §1324 
25 U.S.C. §1326 
Act of May 5, 1864, ch. LXXW, 13 Stat. 64 
Act of May 24, 1888, ch. 310, 25 Stat. 157 
Act of June 4, 1898, ch. 376, 30 Stat. 429 
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Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263 
Joint Resolution of June 19, 1902, Resolution No. 31, 32 Stat. 744 
Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 997 
Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069 
Act of June 28,1910, ch. 140, §23, 36 Stat. 284 
Section 8-1-3(1), Ute Law and Order Code 
U.C.A. §76-2-304 
U.C.A. §78-3a-117(4) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant is a Shoshone Indian native to Utah who was on Indian land at the 
direction of his father. He is charged with hunting on non-Indian land without State 
permits. On October 27, 2002, Defendant Colton Reber was cited by a Utah Fish and 
Wildlife officer for Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, in violation of U.C.A. 
§§23-20-4. At the time he was acting under the direction of his father, who was likewise 
cited for Aiding and Assisting, in violatioin of U.C.A. §§23-20-4 and 23-20-23. The 
underlying allegation was that Colton had shot a trophy buck in the Book Cliffs in Uintah 
County without a valid state permit. Both were charged with a third degree felony. The 
Book Cliffs are within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian 
Reservation. 
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A petition was filed against Colton Reber in the First District Juvenile Court on 
December 23, 2002. The case was subsequently transferred to the Eighth District as the 
situs of the alleged offense. The matter was continued so as to track behind his father's 
case in the district court. On November 6, 2003, a briefing schedule was set, after which 
the issues presented herein were briefed and ruled upon by the juvenile court. However, 
notwithstanding the Defendant understood that the issue of jurisdiction had been ruled 
upon, the issue was opened up again at trial, which was held on March 15, 2004. Having 
not anticipated that the issue would be addressed, Defendant had not brought all the 
anticipated witnesses. Nevertheless, he was able to elicit testimony that the alleged 
offense did take place on Indian land, and that he and his family are aware that they are 
Indians. 
The juvenile court entered a ruling on March 18, 2004, making the remarkable 
finding that "willfulness" does not require "scienter." An appeal was filed on April 5, 
2004, and has been scheduled in conjunction with that of other Indians of Utah Territory 
associated with the Uintah Band. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Prior to the arrival of white settlers in Utah, the territory was inhabited by 
Shoshone Indians. 118-154 
2. On October 3, 1861, the Uinta Valley was set aside as an Indian reservation by 
7 
executive order of President Abraham Lincoln. Congress confirmed this Order on May 5, 
1864, stating that the Uinta Valley was "set apart for the permanent settlement and 
exclusive occupation of such of the different tribes of Indians of said [Utah] territory as 
may be induced to inhabit the same." 118-154 
3. The Defendant, Colton Reber, is an Indian of Utah Territory whose rights were 
reserved under the 1861 Order and the 1864 Act. 118-154 
4. The Defendant' ancestors who were covered by the 1861 Order and the 1864 
Act were Shoshone, not Ute. They spoke the Shoshone language, not the Ute language. 
Their customs are those of the Shoshone people of Utah, Idaho, Nevada, and Wyoming. 
Their customs are not those of the Utes of Colorado. 118-154 
5. After the Uinta Valley was set aside as an Indian reservation, the Department of 
the Interior set up the Uinta Agency to manage the affairs of the Uinta Valley Reserve. 
Those Indians who were located in the Uinta Valley and came under the jurisdiction of 
the Uinta Agency became known as the "Uintah Band." 118-154 
6. During the 1860's and 1870fs, many of the Indians of Utah Territory who were 
not already in the Uinta Valley relocated to the Uinta Agency. Such Indians were 
thereafter referred to as the "Uintah Band." 118-154 
7. The term "Uintah Band" merely identified the agency having jurisdiction over 
the Indians. It had no bearing on the Indians' identity as Shoshone, nor on their rights as 
8 
Indians of Utah Territory. No Treaty or Act of Congress has transferred, modified, 
abrogated, or terminated any rights reserved to those Indians under the 1861 Order or the 
Act of 1864, nor have those Indians surrendered any of those rights. 118-154 
8. In 1881, the White River Band and the Uncompahgre Utes were brought to Utah 
under rmlitary escort from Colorado, having been previously divested of all lands within 
the continental United States. The Uintah Band, the White River Band, and the 
Uncompahgre Utes continue to maintain their separate identities to the present day. These 
separate identities have been recognized by numerous acts of Congress. 118-154 
9. All Indian rights in the Uinta Valley under the 1861 Order and the 1864 Act are 
those of the Uintah Band, inasmuch as neither the Whiterivers nor the Uncompahgres 
inhabited the reservation in 1861, nor are they "Indians of said [Utah] territory," as set 
forth in the Act of May 5, 1864. 118-154 
10. In 1937 the three bands of Indians inhabiting the reservation adopted a 
constitution as the "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation." Nothing in 
the constitution surrendered any rights or assets possessed by any one band to either of 
the other two, nor diminished or abrogated any of the rights possessed by any of the 
separate bands. 118-154 
11. From 1953 until 1966 Congress engaged in a policy of "terminating" federal 
supervision over select Indian tribes. The policy has since been entirely discredited and 
9 
repeatedly renounced by Congress and several presidents, beginning with President 
Richard Nixon in a Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs. Pub. Papers 564 
(Richard M. Nixon, My 8, 1970). Termination applied only to federal benefits. It had no 
effect on tribal identity, nor on vested treaty rights, such as hunting and fishing. 60-82 
12. On August 27, 1954, Congress passed the "Ute Partition Act'' (68 Stat. 877). 
The UPA denominated the majority of the Uintah Band as "mixed-bloods" and termi-
nated their status as Ute Indians. Since that time, the Uintah Band has continued its tribal 
identity without federal supervision. A token portion of the Uintah Band remains under 
the control of the Ute Tribe. However, the Uintah Band is not ethnically Ute. In effect, 
the Uintah Band was only under the control of the Ute Tribe from 1937 to 1954. 118-
154,, 60-82 
13. No other tribe in the United States, either before or since, has ever been 
divided by Congress as between "mixed-bloods" and "full-bloods." 60-82 
14. Under the 1954 Act, a roll of 490 so-called "mixed-bloods" was compiled. 456 
of the 490 were the Uintah Band. The term "mixed-blood" is profoundly derogatory, as 
has been recognized by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. U.S. v. Von Murdock 132 F.3d 
534, 535, n. 1 (10th Cir. 1997). Pursuant to the Act, federal supervision over the 490 was 
terminated. 60-82 
15. Colton's father, Rickie Reber was born in 1952, prior to enactment of the 1954 
10 
Act. Rick Reber was never included on the "termination" roll. 60-82 
16. On July 16, 1958, the Ute Tribal Business Committee passed Resolution 58-
163, which states in pertinent part (60-82): 
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE UINTAH AND OURAY TRIBAL 
BUSINESS COMMITTEE That the fish and game upon all lands to be 
received by the Mixed-Blood group pursuant to the agreed division, as 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall, from the date hereof, be 
under the management and control of the Mixed-Blood group exclusively 
and said Mixed-Blood group, should they so desire, may sell hunting and 
fishing permits or licenses and retain all funds derived therefrom without 
accounting to the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
17. Colton Reber is an Indian of Utah Territory associated with the Uintah Band. 
He is recognized as such by the Uintah Band. He is a descendant of Wansitz, an Indian of 
Utah Territory. The name Wansitz is Shoshone for "Antelope." Wansitz was not a Ute. 
118-154,60-82. 
18. Membership in the Uintah Band requires blood kinship. There are no members 
of the Uintah Band who do not have ancestry from Indians of Utah Territory. This is the 
established custom of the tribe, and therefore the Uintah Band has never set a specific 
minimum blood quantum as a criterion for membership, and Congress has never imposed 
such a quantum on the Uintah Band. 118-154, 60-82 
19. In 1997, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Indian country consisted 
of all lands within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian reservations 
11 
except for those lands withdrawn under the 1902-1905 homestead and townsite laws. Ute 
Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ourav Reservation v. Utah. 114 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997). 
118-154. 
20. The location in the Book Cliffs where Colton was charged with hunting is 
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray reservations. The location has 
never constituted a homestead or townsite under the 1902-1905 acts. 118-154 
21. In 2002, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed that Indians of Utah 
Territory covered by the Act of May 5, 1864, are entitled to hunt on Indian lands without 
state interference. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway. 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002). 118-154 
22. At the time of the alleged offenses, Colton was acting at the direction of his 
father, and in reliance on the 10& Circuit's rulings in Ute Tribe v. Utah and Conway. 118-
154. 
23. Notwithstanding the 10th Circuit's rulings in Ute Tribe v. Utah and Conway, 
the trial court held that it had jurisdiction over the Defendant. 32 
24. In his pretrial motion, the Defendant moved to present evidence that his 
reliance upon the rulings of the 10th Circuit was reasonable. The proffered evidence 
included testimony by the county recorder that the location in question is within the 
territory defined in Ute Tribe v. Utah, and extensive evidence that the Defendant is in fact 
an Indian of Utah Territory as defined in Conway. 33-59 
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25. The trial court prohibited the Defendant from presenting any evidence as to 
reasonable reliance, adopting the district court's reasoning without further consideration. 
32 
26. Trial was held on in the juvenile court on March 15, 2004. The evidence 
elicited indicated that the Defendant was within the exterior boundaries of the Indian 
reservation at the time of the alleged offense. The court declined to receive more 
evidence. 2, pp. 30-33, 38. 
27. The court would not hear that Colton was on Indian land, that he was an 
Indian, or that he had reason to believe he could rely on federal rulings that defined that 
Indian status. The court returned a guilty verdict on March 18, 2004. 22-25. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The State has no jurisdiction to prosecute the Defendant. The Defendants is an 
Indian who was exercising federally protected rights on Indian land. The State of Utah 
has no jurisdiction over the conduct, nor over the territory in question. 
A. The court is obligated to follow federal law. Indian rights are determined by 
federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law is binding upon the states in 
general, and state court judges in particular. 
B. Federal jurisdiction over Indian lands is exclusive. By federal statute, as well as 
caselaw, federal jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on Indian lands, including offenses 
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by supposed non-Indians, is exclusive. Indeed, the federal statute for prosecuting non-
Indians for hunting on Indian lands was enacted for the explicit reason that the states lack 
jurisdiction to do so. 
1. The alleged offenses took place in Indian country. In accordance with the most 
recent, binding rulings of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as federal statute, the 
Book Cliffs in Uintah County constitute "Indian country." 
2. The State has no jurisdiction if the victim of the alleged offense is an Indian 
tribe. The wildlife in Indian country belongs to the Indians. The Ute tribe has asserted 
this ownership by specific enactment. Accordingly, only Indians could be victims of the 
alleged offenses. Under the rulings of this Court, the State of Utah lacks jurisdiction if the 
victim of an offense is an Indian in Indian country. 
C. The State has no jurisdiction over the conduct in question. States can only 
obtain jurisdiction over Indian lands by complying with specific steps defined by federal 
statute, amending their state constitutions accordingly, and receiving the consent of the 
affected tribe. None of these steps have been taken, and even if they had been, hunting 
and fishing rights would still be exempt. 
1. Hunting and fishing are sovereign rights predating the existence of the United 
States. Hunting and fishing rights are not privileges or benefits. They are rights of 
sovereignty which Indian tribes have possessed since time immemorial. As such, they 
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cannot be extinguished absent a treaty or act of Congress that is explicit as to its intent. 
No such treaty or act has ever been enacted with regard to the Indians of Utah Territory. 
2. Hunting and fishing rights do not require enrollment in a federally recognized 
tribe. "Federal recognition" consists of inclusion on the Secretary of the Interior's list of 
tribes that qualify for federal benefits. Federal recognition pertains only to those benefits 
which are created by Congress. Inasmuch as hunting and fishing are sovereign rights 
predating Congress, federal recognition has no bearing on their exercise. 
3. The Uintah Band possesses vested treaty rights. The "Uintah Band" consists of 
Indians of Utah Territory who came within the jurisdiction of the onetime Uinta Agency. 
Their sovereign rights were reserved to them under the Executive Order of October 3, 
1861, and the Act of Congress of May 5, 1864. They are the only Indians in the Uintah 
Basin who have claim upon these rights. These rights have been recognized by numerous 
acts of Congress. 
4. The Uintah Band is a separate and independent entity from the Ute Tribe. It 
existed prior the creation of the Ute Tribe in 1937, and has existed independently of the 
Ute Tribe since 1954. It received no rights from the Ute Tribe, and has conferred none 
upon it. As such, the actions of the Ute Tribe have no bearing upon the rights of the 
Defendant. 
5. Indian tribes determine their own membership criteria. It is for Indian tribes, and 
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Indian tribes alone, to determine who is and who is not a member of their tribe. Blood 
quantum is only one of many factors. If an Indian tribe acknowledges a person as a 
member, the sole question for a state court is not that person's blood quantum, but 
whether that tribe is legitimate. If so, all farther inquiry by the state court must cease. 
D. The Ute Partion Act had no effect on vested treaty rights. The district court, 
which the juvenile court apparently adopted, relied upon the Ute Partition Act of August 
27, 1954 (68 Stat. 877; 25 U.S.C. §677-677aa) in determining that the Defendant is not 
an Indian and has no right to hunt or fish. In fact, the UPA has no relevance to hunting 
and fishing rights. 
1. By its own terms, the effect of the UPA is limited to federal benefits. The UPA 
makes no mention of vested treaty rights, such as hunting and fishing. The federal courts 
which have addressed this federal law have so stated explicitly. 
2. The UPA specifically exempts indivisible assets from its operation. Under the 
UPA, certain assets were divided between the Utes and those who had been expelled 
from the Ute Tribe. Those assets that were susceptible to equitable and practicable 
distribution remained the common property of all the Indians. 
3. Hunting and fishing rights are an indivisible asset. The federal courts have 
repeatedly held that hunting and fishing rights are among those assets that are not 
susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution. This is acknowledged by the United 
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States Solicitor. 
4. The UPA confers no jurisdiction on the State over hunting and fishing rights on 
Indian lands. Tribal assets not otherwise distributed under the UPA remain under 
exclusive federal and tribal jurisdiction. Hunting and fishing are one of those retained 
assets. The Ute Tribe itself has acknowledged as much. 
5. Termination cannot be imputed to persons not included on the termination roll. 
Colton's father was bom as a full-blooded Indian prior to the UPA. His name was never 
included on the list of Indians terminated. Any law presuming to abrogate Indian rights 
must be strictly construed. There is no provision in the UPA for terminating persons other 
than those on the termination roll. 
6. The UPA has no effect on the separate assets of the Uintah Band. The UPA 
only affected the assets of the Ute Tribe. It makes no mention of the Uintah Band, and 
thus has no affect on those assets. The hunting rights of the Defendant are those of the 
Uintah Band, not of the Ute Tribe. 
7. The trial court has no jurisdiction to interpret the UPA. Only the federal courts 
have jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the UPA. Not even tribal courts are authorized, 
and certainly not state courts. 
8. The UPA is unconstitutional. The explicit basis of the UPA, blood quantum, 
violates the XIVth Amendment. Its implicit basis, elimination of the Uintah Band, is void, 
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inasmuch as any act attempting to deprive Indians of reserved sovereign rights must be 
explicit as to its intent. 
a. The UPA violates the Equal Protection clause of the XIVth Amendment. The 
UPA is the only termination act ever enacted that presumes to divide a tribe along racial 
lines. It thus crosses the line from legislating over an Indian tribe as apolitical entity and 
instead deprives a people of their rights based solely on race, 
b. The UPA is a covert attempt to eliminate all Indian rights in the Uintah Basin. 
Without mentioning the tribe by name, the UPA was nevertheless undertaken as a means 
of destroying the Uintah Band. Its presumptions are manifest in its execution. 
II. Colton Reber cannot be held culpable for the offense charged. For a number of 
reasons, Colton entirely lacked any criminal intent. Intent is a necessary element of the 
charged offense. 
A. The Defendant cannot be held liable for acting at the direction of his father. 
Colton was acting as the direction of his father, and they both were acting in good faith 
reliance upon published rulings the 10th Circuit Court of Appeal, as well as proclamations 
oftheUte Tribe. 
B. The Defendant is presumed incompetent to commit a crime unless proven 
otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. Colton was 13 at the time of the alleged offense. 
The defense of Infancy has not been abrogated by statute, but incorporated into its 
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structure. Accordingly, a child between the ages of 7 and 14 is presumed incompetent, 
which incompetence remains unless and until overcome by evidence. 
III. U.C.A. §78-3a-117(4) is unconstitutional. The statute creating jurisdiction in 
the juvenile court deprives defendants of the due process right to a presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty, instead associating jurisdiction with culpability. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The State lacks jurisdiction to prosecute the Defendant* 
The law is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, 
by either party or by the Court. State v. Perank 858 P.2d 927,930 (Utah 1992). Further, 
"when subject matter jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court can do 
anything to fill the void." Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990)(Internal 
citation omitted). Without subject matter jurisdiction, the Court has no power to hear the 
controversy, and the case must be dismissed. See Conway, 286 F.3d at 1201 (Jurisdiction 
is a threshold question that appellate court must resolve before addressing merits.)(ctfz>ig 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 
L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). 
A. The court is obligated to follow federal law. 
Article VI, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
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made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
Federal Indian law consists of Treaties made under the Authority of the United 
States and Laws made in Pursuance of the Constitution. Accordingly, the State of Utah 
and its judges are specifically bound by the rulings of federal courts in cases to which the 
State or its officers are parties. 
Article in, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part: 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that.. . Indian 
lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
Congress of the United States. 
Article II, Section 26, of the Utah Constitution states, "The provisions of this 
Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to 
be otherwise." Article I, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution states, "The State of Utah is 
an inseparable part of the Federal Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land." The trial court relied upon the distirct court, which could only 
find State jurisdiction by ignoring the relevant federal statutes and rulings, which is was 
bound by Utah constitutional law to uphold. Upon this fundamental error, most other 
errors of the trial court were compiled. 
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B. Federal jurisdiction over Indian lands is exclusive. 
"Indian country is subject to exclusive federal or tribal criminal jurisdiction 
'[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law.' 18 U.S.C. §1152." Ross v. Neff. 905 
F.2d 1349,1352 (10th Cir. 1990). State jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian 
country is limited to criminal acts committed "by non-Indians against non-Indians . . . and 
victimless crimes by non-Indians." Solem v. Bartlett. 465 U.S. 463,465 n.2, 104 S.Ct. 
1161, 79 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). Indian interests implicate federal responsibility. The State 
thus can only exercise criminal jurisdiction when Indian interests are absent. See State v. 
Sorkhabi 46 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. App. 2002). "[T]he protection that federal law, 
treaties, and statutes extend to Indian occupancy is 'exclusively the province of federal 
law.'" Conway. 286 F.3d at 1203, citing Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe. 442 U.S. 653, 
670-671, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979), quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. 
County of Oneida. 414 U.S. 661, 670, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974). State officials 
who interfere with such protection are in violation of federal law. ANR Pipeline Co. v. 
Lafaver. 150 F.2d 1178, 1193 (10* Cir. 1998). 
Federal jurisdiction is specifically exclusive when the alleged offense is a hunting 
or fishing violation. 18 U.S.C. §1165 provides: 
Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully and 
knowingly goes upon any land that belongs to any Indian or Indian tribe, 
band, or group and either are held by the United States in trust or are 
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subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States, or 
upon any lands of the United States that are reserved for Indian use, for the 
purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the removal of game, 
peltries, or fish therefrom, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than ninety days, or both, and all game, fish, and peltries in his 
possession shall be forfeited. 
This federal statute was passed for the specific reason that states have no 
jurisdiction to prosecute hunting or fishing offenses committed in Indian country and 
tribal courts are prohibited from exercising criminal jurisdiction over "non-Indians" for 
offenses committed in Indian country. Montana v. United States. 450 U.S. 544, 563, 101 
S.Ct 1245, 1257,67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). "House Report No. 2593 stated that the 
purpose of the bill that became 18 U.S.C. §1165 was to make it unlawful to enter Indian 
land to hunt, trap, or fish without the consent of the individual Indian or tribe." Montana. 
450 U.S. at 562,101 S.Ct. at 1256. 18 U.S.C. § 1165 "fills a gap in the present law for the 
protection of their property." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206, 98 
S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) and S.Rep.No. 1686. "18 U.S.C. §1165 was 
designed to fill that gap " United States v. Felter. 752 F.2d 1505, 1512, n. 11 (10th Or. 
1985)(A Uinta Valley case.) No "gap in the present law" would have existed if states had 
jurisdiction to prosecute hunting and fishing offenses occuring on Indian lands. There has 
been no change in federal or state law that would confer such jurisdicition on the State. 
1. The alleged offenses took place in Indian country. The 10th Circuit Court of 
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Appeals has held that Indian lands consist of all lands within the exterior boundaries of 
the Uinta and Uncompahgre Reservations, except those lands that passed from trust to fee 
status pursuant to non-Indian settlement under the 1902-1905 allotment legislation. Act of 
May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263, 263-64; Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 982, 
997-998; Act of Apr. 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 207-08; Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 
1479, 33 Stat. 1048,1069-70. Those lands that passed to fee status under these acts did so 
"under the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States." 
Ute Tribe v. Utah. 114 F.3d at 1517. The 10th Circuit further ruled that determining which 
lands were homesteaded under the 1902-1905 legislation would require a title search. 114 
F.3d at 1530. This title search has never taken place. Inasmuch as the burden is upon the 
State to establish jurisdiction, the burden is squarely upon the State to conduct such a title 
search before attempting to assert jurisdiction over the Defendants. It is indisputable that 
the locations at which the Defendants are alleged to have committed the offenses are 
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as recognized by the 
federal government, and that those locations have never been homesteads or townsites 
under the 1902-1905 Acts. 
The alleged offenses also took place squarely within the definition of Indian 
country as set forth in federal statute: 
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, 
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the term "Indian country", as used in this chapter [18 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et 
seq.], means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under 
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the 
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the 
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all 
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 
including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. §1151. See also Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State 
Penitentiary. 368 U.S. 351, 357, 82 S.Ct 424, 428, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962). This places the 
location within the jurisdiction of the United States and the Indian tribe, exclusive of the 
State. 18 U.S.C. §1152 states: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of 
the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place 
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the 
District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian 
against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian 
committing any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the 
local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the 
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian 
tribes respectively. 
2. The State has no jurisdiction if fee victim of the alleged offense is an Indian 
tribe. "The language and history of 18 U.S.C. §1165 show that the right of Indians to 
control hunting, trapping and fishing on their lands is a prerogative of ownership which 
the United States recognizes as a matter of federal law." United States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 
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822, 834 (9th Cir. 1977). In an effort to protect these rights, and in exercise of its rights of 
self-government, the Ute Tribe enacted Ordinance 00-001 for the purpose of regulating 
the activities of non-members on the reservation. This exercise of the Tribe's inherent 
right of self-government, as well as the Tribe's interest in fish and game on Indian lands, 
takes a high priority over state jurisdiction. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. State of New 
Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 728 (10th Cir. 1980). Any effort by the State to exercise 
jurisdiction infringes upon these inherent rights of the Tribe. Id. at 730. Under Utah law, 
the State has no jurisdiction over any crime committed in Indian country in which the 
victim is an Indian or an Indian tribe. State v. Valdez. 65 P.3d 1191 (Utah App. 2003). 
The Ute Tribe clearly claims an interest in the fish and game of the reservation. Section 
8-1-3(1) of the Ute Law and Order Code states: 
All wildlife now or hereafter within the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, not held by private ownership legally acquired, and which for 
purposes of this Code shall include all big game animals, game birds, 
waterfowl, game fish, amphibians and fiir-bearing animals mentioned in 
this Code, are hereby declared to be the property of the Ute Indian Tribe 
and no right, title, interest or property therein can be acquired or transferred 
or possession thereof had or maintained except as herein expressly 
provided. (Emphasis added). 
Inasmuch as the Ute Tribe claims ownership of the big game which the Defendants 
are alleged to have taken, the victim of the alleged offense is a federally supervised Indian 
tribe, and the State of Utah is divested of jurisdiction to prosecute. State v. Valdez, 65 
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P.3d 1191 (Utah App. 2003). 
While the Indians of Utah Territory do not recognize the authority of the Ute 
Tribe, the State of Utah is nevertheless bound to recognize the Ute Tribe's authority over 
Indians and persons committing acts against Indian property within Indian country. The 
powers of self-government reserved to Indian tribes explicitly include "the inherent 
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over all Indians." 25 U.S.C. §1301(2)(Emphasis added). Thus, Indian tribes may exercise 
jurisdiction over all Indians within a reservation, not just enrolled members of the 
resident tribe. Federal and tribal jurisdiction are therefore exclusive within Indian country 
to the exclusion of State authority. 
Concurrent State jurisdiction can only be asserted where it has not been preempted 
by the operation of federal law. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe. 462 U.S. 324, 
333, 103 S.Ct. 2378,2386, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983). Hunting and fishing within Indian 
country has been preempted by federal law. 462 U.S. at 337-338,103 S.Ct. 2388, 67 Stat. 
588, 18 U.S.C. §1162(b), 18 U.S.C. §1165, 25 U.S.C. §1321(b). Unless and until the 
State can meet its burden of showing that it has expressly been granted jurisdiction within 
Indian country by act of Congress, and by showing that Congress has not preempted for 
itself and for the resident Indian tribes the regulation of hunting and fishing within Indian 
country, the State cannot exercise jurisdiction over the Defendant. 
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C. The State has no jurisdiction over the conduct in question. 
Article HI, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part; 
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they 
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying 
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned 
or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall 
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain 
subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall 
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the 
United States. (Emphasis added) 
Before the State can exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country, 
three things must occur: (1) There must be a cession of such jurisdiction to the State by 
Congress, (2) any Indian tribe potentially subject to such jurisdiction must consent thereto 
by special election in accordance with federal law, and (3) the State constitution must be 
amended to eliminate any provisions preventing the exercise of such jurisdiction. 
Inasmuch as the State has the burden to prove jurisdiction, it is incumbent upon the State 
to prove that these three conditions have been satisfied. 
The first condition is addressed by 25 U.S.C. §1321, which specifically excludes 
hunting and fishing rights from State jurisdiction: 
(a) Consent of United States: force and effect of criminal laws. The 
consent of the United States is hereby given any State not having 
jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or against Indians in the 
areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume, with the 
consent of the Indian tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part 
thereof which could be affected by such assump-tion, such measure of 
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jurisdiction over any or all of such offenses committed within such Indian 
country or any part thereof as may be determined by such State to the same 
extent that such State has jurisdiction over any such offense committed 
elsewhere within the State, and the criminal laws of such State shall have 
the same force and effect within such Indian country or part thereof as they 
have elsewhere within that State. 
(b) Alienation, encumbrance, taxation, and use of property: hunting. 
trapping, or fishing. Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, 
encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water 
rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that 
is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the 
use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, 
agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall 
deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, 
privilege or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute 
with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or 
regulation thereof (Emphasis added) 
In regard to amendment of the State Constitution, 25 U.S.C. §1324 provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any enabling Act for the 
admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the 
people of any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or 
existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the 
assumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the 
provisions of this title. The provisions of this title shall not become effective 
with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the 
people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or 
statutes, as the case may be. (Emphasis added) 
In regard to consent by the affected tribe, 25 U.S.C. §1326 provides: 
State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this title with respect to 
criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with respect to both, shall be 
applicable in Indian country only where the enrolled Indians within the 
affected area of such Indian country accept such jurisdiction by a majority 
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vote of the adult Indians voting at a special election held for that purpose. 
The Secretary of the Interior shall call such special election under such 
rules and regulations as he may prescribe, when requested to do so by the 
tribal council or other governing body, or by 20 per centum of such enrolled 
adults. (Emphasis added) 
The federal statute which otherwise cedes to the states criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians in Indian country specifically excludes hunting, fishing, and trapping from State 
jurisdiction. The State Constitution has never been amended to permit State jurisdiction 
over Indian country within the State, and neither the Uintah Band nor the Ute Tribe has 
ever held a special election to consent to such jurisdiction. Thus, as a matter of State 
constitutional law the State cannot exercise jurisdiction over the Defendants for the 
offenses charged. Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, Order of March 18, 2001, page 10 
(D.Utah, 2:00CV734C), affd, 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002). 
This is specifically applicable to the Uinta Valley and the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation, where an Indian exercising pre-existing hunting rights cannot be criminally 
charged for exercising those rights. United States v. Felter. 752 F.2d at 1512. Indeed, the 
same court noted that no Utah Indian tribe has ever consented to State jurisdiction. 752 
F.2d at 1508, n. 7. It is hard to imagine how the State could exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over conduct that cannot be defined as a crime in federal court and for which, explicitly, 
jurisdiction has never been conferred upon the State. 
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1. Hunting and fishing are sovereign rights predating the existence of the United 
States. "Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to them, 
unless such rights were clearly relinquished by treaty or have been modified by Congress. 
These rights need not be expressly mentioned in the treaty." Conway. 286 F.3d at 1202, 
quoting United States v. Dion. 476 U.S. 734, 738, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 
(1986)(Internal citations omitted). This is in direct contrast with federal benefits, which 
are conferred by Congress and require federal recognition. Western Shoshone Business 
Council v. Babbitt. 1 F.3d 1052 (10th Cir. 1993). Hunting and fishing rights are not 
"statutory benefits," because they were not created by Congress, but rather are incidents 
of sovereignty pre-dating the creation of the United States. United States v. Oregon. 657 
F.2d 1009, 1013-1014 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Moreover, "[t]he Department of the Interior cannot under any 
circumstances abrogate an Indian treaty directly or indirectly. Only 
Congress can abrogate a treaty, and only by making absolutely clear its 
intention to do so." United States v. Washington. 641 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th 
Cir. 1981); see also Dion. 476 U.S. at 738-40, 106 S.Ct. 2216; Wilson. 442 
U.S. at 670-71, 99 S.Ct. 2529. Thus, the fact that a tribe is not adminis-
tratively recognized does not affect that tribe's vested treaty rights. See 
Greene v. Babbitt. 64 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Menominee 
Tribe v. United States. 391 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 20 L.Ed.2d 697 
(1968)(treaty hunting rights survived despite congressional termination of 
all formal tribal political authority). "[A] tribe's recognition or lack of 
recognition by the Secretary of the Interior does not determine whether the 
tribe has vested treaty rights." Greene. 64 F.3d at 1270. "Non-recognition 
of the tribe by the federal government and the failure of the Secretary of the 
Interior to approve a tribe's enrollment may result in loss of statutory 
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benefits, but can have no impact on vested treaty rights." Id. (quoting 
United States v. Washington. 520 F.2d 676, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
Conway, 286 F.3d at 1203. The sole benefit derived from being included on the 
Secretary of the Interior's list is the right to receive benefits created by Congress, a 
benefit the Indians of Utah Territory are not seeking. Conway. 286 F.3d at 1204. The 
facts as set forth at the beginning of this Brief, regarding the identity of the Indians of 
Utah Territory and the rights retained under the Executive Order of October 3, 1861, and 
the Act of May 5, 1864, are "clearly sufficient" to establish the hunting and fishing rights 
of those Indians as a matter of law. Conway, 286 F.3d at 1204. 
2. Hunting and fishing rights do not require enrollment in a federally recognized 
tribe. It is well established that numerous tribes exercise treaty rights without federal 
recognition. United States v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 901 F.2d 772, 776 n. 10 (9th Cir. 
1990), Greene v. U.S.. 996 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1993)(Stillaguamish, Upper Skagit, and 
other unrecognized Washington Indian tribes exercise treaty fishing rights). Even 
terminated tribes (which the Uintah Band has never been) retain treaty hunting rights 
despite congressional termination of all formal political authority. Menominee Tribe v. 
U.S.. supra; Conway, 286 F.3d at 1203. There is simply no justification in federal law for 
the trial court's view that only enrolled members of federally recognized tribes may 
exercise tribal hunting and fishing rights. 
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Consistent with federal law, the Utah courts have recognized veiy simply that, 
"Formal enrollment in a federally recognized tribe is not required" to establish individual 
Indian status. State v. Hagen 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990), reversed on other 
grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1993), afTd Hagen v. Utak 510 U.S. 399, 114 S.Ct 958, 
127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). In its Hagen decision, the Utah Court of Appeals was asked to 
address (1) the territorial limits of the reservation, and (2) the defendant's status as an 
Indian. The court relied on federal law in determining that the alleged offense took place 
in Indian country, and having done so then found that the defendant's Indian status was 
sufficient to defeat State jurisdiction in that Indian country, even though he was neither a 
Ute nor an Indian of Utah Territory. 
The Court of Appeals specific finding on the territorial issue was overturned by 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hagen, 858 P.2d 925, 926 (Utah 1992). However, its 
specific finding on Indian status was not: "We conclude that Myton, Utah, where 
defendant's alleged offense occurred, is therefore not in Indian country. Thus, in the 
instant case defendant's criminal conduct may form the basis of state court jurisdiction, 
regardless of defendant's personal Indian status." 858 P.2d at 926 (Emphasis added, 
internal citations omitted). This ruling was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, 
sustaining the Utah Supreme Court on the issue of territorial jurisdiction and leaving the 
Utah Court of Appeals' ruling on Indian status untouched. Hagen v. Utah. 510 U.S. 399, 
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114 S.Ct. 958, 127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). The ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
regard to Indian status thus remains the law binding upon the trial court. 
As noted by the Utah Court of Appeals, "the defendant must be recognized as an 
Indian either by the federal government or by some tribe or society of Indians." State v. 
Hagen. 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990)(Emphasis added). Enrollment in a federally 
recognized tribe automatically constitutes recognition of individual Indian status by the 
federal government, regardless of blood quantum. Inasmuch as the Hagen ruling refers to 
recognition by the federal government or by some tribe or society of Indians, it is clear 
that under State law, there is no requirement that the tribe or society of Indians be itself 
recognized by the federal government. This is consistent with the federal government's 
position that a tribe does not have to be federally recognized to possess hunting and 
fishing rights. Conwav. 286 F.3d at 1203-1204. 
3. The Uintah Band possesses vested treaty rights. The Indians of Utah Territory 
associated with the Uintah Band are a separate and distinct people from the White Rivers 
and the Uncompahgre Utes, and are the only Indians to whom apply the Executive Order 
of October 3, 1861, and the Act of Congress of May 5, 1864. The separate rights of the 
Uintah Band have been the subject of both federal acts and rulings. Act of May 5, 1864, 
ch. LXXVII, 13 Stat. 64; Act of May 24, 1888, ch. 310, 25 Stat. 157; Act of June 4, 1898, 
ch. 376,30 Stat. 429; Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263; Joint Resolution of 
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June 19, 1902, Resolution No. 31, 32 Stat. 744; Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 
997; Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069; Act of June 28, 1910, ch. 140, §23, 
36 Stat. 284; Hackford v. Babbitt. 14 F.3d 1457,1469 (10th Cir. 1994); Ute Indian Tribe 
of Uintah & Ourav Reservation v. Utah. 935 F.Supp. 1473, 1502 (D.Utah 1996). 
By Act of May 24, 1888 (ch. 310,25 Stat. 157), Congress removed certain lands 
from the Uintah Valley Indian Reservation (as distinct from the Uncompahgre 
Reservation), directed that the consent of such Indians (i.e., the Uintah Band) be 
obtained, and that the proceeds from the sales of such lands be held in trust on behalf of 
those same Indians. By Act of June 4,1898 (ch. 376, 30 Stat. 429) Congress directed that 
allotments be made to the Indians of the Uintah Indian Reservation, and specifically 
defined these as separate and distinct from allotments to Indians of the Uncompahgre 
Reservation. The Act of May 27,1902 (ch. 888, 32 Stat. 263) specifically distinguishes 
between the Uintah, Whiteriver, and Uncompahgre Bands, as does the Joint Resolution of 
June 19, 1902 (Resolution No. 31, 32 Stat. 744), the Act of March 3, 1903 (ch. 994, 32 
Stat. 997), and the Act of March 3, 1905 (ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069). 
Without exception, all allotment legislation pertaining to the Uintah Valley 
Reservation recognizes the separate rights and status of the Uintah Band. By Act of June 
28, 1910 (ch. 140, §23, 36 Stat. 284) Congress specifically compensated the Uintah 
Indians, and the Uintah Indians alone, for lands appropriated for the Strawberry 
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Reclamation Project. Section 677r of the UPA states: '"Nothing in sections 611-611 aa of 
this title shall effect any claim heretofore filed against the United States by the tribe, or 
the individual bands comprising the tribe." This section recognizes the separate existence 
and rights of the Uintah Band. 
No allotments were ever made to or by the Ute Tribe, inasmuch as allotment was 
repealed by the Wheeler-Howard Act in 1934 (25 U.S.C. §461), and the Ute Tribe was 
not called into existence under that act until 1937. 25 U.S.C. §476. This is significant, 
because all water on the reservation has a priority date of October 3, 1861. Hackford v. 
Babbitt, 14 F.3d at 1469, citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S.Ct 207, 52 
L.Ed. 340 (1908). Inasmuch as neither the Whiterivers nor the Uncompahgres inhabited 
the reservation in 1861, nor can claim any rights under the Executive Order of October 3, 
1861, or the Act of Congress of May 5, 1864, ratifying that act, all Indian water rights in 
the Uintah Valley are necessarily those of the Uintah Band. 
The Ute Tribe could not allot what it did not possess, and indeed, the Ute Tribe 
specifically renounces in its own constitution any claim to make such allotments. Article 
n, Sec. 2(a): "No property rights shall be acquired or lost through membership in this 
organization except as provided herein." Article VI, Sec. 4: "Any rights and powers 
heretofore vested in the Tribe or bands of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation but not 
expressly referred to in this Constitution shall not be abridged by this article." Article 
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VHI, Sec. 1: "Allotted lands, including heirship lands, within the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation shall continue to be held as heretofore, by their present owners.... The right 
of the individual Indian to hold or part with his land, as under existing law, shall not be 
abrogated by anything contained in this Constitution." 
And just as water rights derive solely from the Uintah Band, to whom they were 
allotted, so, too, do the hunting and fishing rights on the reservation derive solely from 
the Uintah Band. It is well established that descendants of allottees are entitled to federal 
protection. United States v. Osage County. 251 U.S. 128, 133, 40 S.Ct. 100, 102, 64 
L.Ed. 184 (1919). So likewise are the hunting and fishing rights of the Uintah Band and 
their descendants protected under federal law. Ute Tribe v. Utah. 935 F.Supp. at 1502. 
4. The Uintah Band is a separate and independent entity. Nothing in die 
incorporation of the Ute Tribe in 1937 or its constitution gives that tribe any right to 
determinine either the membership or the rights of the Uintah Band. The Uintah Band has 
the exclusive right to determine its own membership. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 436 
U.S. 49, 72, n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684, n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). Most of Uintahs 
affected by the UPA were never listed on the Ute tribal rolls until their names appeared 
on the terminaton roll in 1956. Prior to that time they had only been listed as Uintahs. 
"The roll makes no reference to band affiliation." Hackford v. Babbitt. 14 F.3d at 1462. If 
it had, it would have shown that 456 of the 490 terminated "Utes" were Uintahs. Only 
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208 Uintahs remained enrolled as Utes. 
Just as the Ute Tribe has no authority to determine the membership of the Uintah 
Band, so likewise a minority has no authority to expel a majority. Only the Uintahs could 
expel Uintahs, and only a majority could do so. That has never taken place. The Ute 
Tribe never made allotments to the Uintahs. The Uintahs brought their allotments with 
them into the Ute Tribe. The Ute Tribe never granted hunting and fishing rights to the 
Uintahs. The Uintahs brought their hunting rigihts with them. When the Uintahs were 
expelled from the Ute Tribe, they took their allotments, their water rights, and their 
hunting and fishing rights with them. Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d at 1469. Ute Tribe v. 
Utah, 935 F.Supp. at 1502. 
Only recognized Indians could receive allotments. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119,24 
Stat. 388-391. Their descendants retain Indian status regardless of blood quantum. United 
States v. Osage County, supra. Due to the strength of its traditions, the Uintah Band has 
never had the need to impose a minimum blood quantum requirement upon its members, 
and has never had one imposed upon it by Congress. This has remained so, notwith-
standing the numerous allotment and other acts passed specifically on its behalf. Those 
acts nevertheless confirm that the Uintahs are recognized as Indians by the federal 
government. 
The Defendant is an Indian of Utah Territory and a member of the Uintah Band. 
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As such he retains all rights reserved under the Executive Order of October 3, 1861, and 
the Act of May 5, 1864, which the Indians of Utah Territory brought to the Uintah Band. 
Just as the allotment rights of the Uintah Band never belonged to the Ute Tribe, and never 
could under the Ute Constitution, so likewise the Ute Tribe has no claim upon the hunting 
and fishing rights of the Uintah Band. And just as the allotment and water rights of the 
Uintah Band have never come under State jurisdiction, so likewise the State of Utah has 
no jurisdiction over the hunting and fishing rights of the Uintah Band. Regardless of how 
Ute tribal assets may pass under the UP A, Uintah tribal assets continue under the allot-
ment and other acts by which they were recognized prior to the creation of the Ute Tribe. 
5. Indian tribes determine their own membership criteria. It is well established that 
each Indian tribe has the right to determine its own membership criteria. Santa Clara 
Pueblo v.Martinez. 436, U.S. 49, 72 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1684 n. 32, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 
(1978); U.S.v.VonMurdock. 132 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Or. 1997). Once a tribe has 
recognized a person as a member, the only question for the State is whether the tribe itself 
is genuine. The first question thus is not whether the Defendant has sufficient Indian 
blood, but whether he is recognized as an Indian by a tribe possessing treaty rights under 
federal law. Once it is established that the tribe has legal rights, it is sufficient to show 
that the Defendant is recognized as an Indian by that tribe. If he is so recognized, the 
State has no more right to question his blood quantum than it does to question the blood 
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quantum of an enrolled Ute. 
Under Hagen (Utah App. 1990), blood quantum is not relevant unless a person is 
claiming Indian status without being affiliated with a tribe. Otherwise, blood quantum is 
neither the primary nor the determining factor in determining whether a person is an 
Indian for purposes of State jurisdiction. "[T]he terms concerning "blood," such as "full-
blood," "mixed-blood," "blood quantum," and related quantitative terms such as "half-
breed," are . . . without scientific basis." The Arbitrary Indian. Gail K. Sheffield, 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1997, page 83. "[Tjhe use of blood quantum to define the 
modem Indian population poses enormous conceptual and practical problems." American 
Indians: The First of this Land Matthew C. Snipp, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1989, page 44. 
The U.S. Census Bureau does not require anjr blood quantum in determining 
Indian status. The Arbritary Indian, supra, pages 86-87. Cohen's Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law, the definitive authority on Indian law, states: "In dealing with Indians, the 
federal government is dealing with members or descendants of political entities, that is, 
Indian tribes, not with persons of a particular racer F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law, (1982 ed.), page 19, citing United States v. Antelope. 430 U.S. 641, 646 
(1977)(Emphasis added). 
[F]ederal regulation of Indian affairs is not based upon 
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impermissible [racial] classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in 
the unique status of Indians as "a separate people" with their own political 
institutions. Federal regulation of tribes, therefore, is governance of once-
sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of a 
'"racial' group consisting of 'Indians' 
Id., citing Morton v. Mancart 417 U.S. 535, 553, n.24 (1974). See also Cohen. 
page 654. 
"The Court has also supported its holdings in these cases by characterizing Indians 
in federal law as a political rather than as a racial classification. The Court said that 
Indian laws apply by virtue of tribal membership rather than because of the race of the 
parties." Cohen, page 655, citing Fisher v. District Court. 424 U.S. 382, 391-91 (1976), 
Morton v. Mancari supra. 
Race is synonymous with ancestry. The Arbitrary Indian, supra, page 133. 
However, in contrast to a race-based approach, individual status follows tribal status, and 
there can be no Indian without a tribe. See Epps v. Andrus. 611 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1979). 
"The tribal experience — the collective experience - is the essence of being Indian in this 
modern world. There are, as we have seen, tribes that function as such in the 
sociocultural sense, even if they are not recognized by the federal government as 
sovereign political entities." The Arbitrary Indian, supra, page 95. "The courts have 
consistently recognized that one of an Indians tribe's most basic powers is the authority 
to determine questions of its own membership.... The power of an Indian tribe to 
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determine questions of its own membership derives from the character of an Indian tribe 
as a distinct political entity." Cohen, supra, page 20. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n. 32 (1978). The common law does not apply to Indian tribes, 
and even the federal government must recognize membership based on tribal custom. 
Waldron v. United States. 143 Fed. 413 (C.C.S.D. 1905). 
Once it is established that the Indians of Utah Territory associated with the Uintah 
Band possess treaty rights that are protected under federal law, it should have been 
sufficient for the trial court to know that the Defendant is recognized by the Uintah Band 
as a member of that tribe, and the action should have been dismissed for lack of State 
jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the trial court did not apply this rule. 
D. The Ute Partion Act had no effect on vested treaty rights. 
The trial court received extensive briefing as to the effect of the Ute Partition Act 
of August 27, 1954 (68 Stat. 877; 25 U.S.C. §677-677aa). This was a red herring. The 
UPA had no eflfect on vested treaty rights, such as hunting and fishing, and had no effect 
on the separate rights and assets of the Indians of Utah Territory associated with the 
Uintah Band. The court ruled otherwise. 
1. By its own terms, the effect of the UPA is limited to federal benefits. 25 U.S.C. 
§677, the preamble to the Ute Partition Act states: 
The purpose of sections 677-677aa of this title is to provide for the 
41 
partition and distribution of the assets of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation in Utah between the mixed-blood and full-blood 
members thereof; for the termination of Federal supervision over the trust, 
and restricted property, of the mixed-blood members of said tribe; and for a 
development program for the fiill-blood members thereof, to assist them in 
preparing for termination of Federal supervision over their property. 
(Emphasis added) 
"Federal supervision" is a benefit created by Congress, and can in like manner be 
revoked by Congress or conditioned on tribal recognition by the Secretary of the Interior. 
As has now been well-established, hunting and fishing rights are not a federal benefit, but 
rather, an inherent treaty right that cannot be revoked absent a treaty or an act of 
Congress explicit as to its intent. Hunting and fishing rights also cannot be conditioned 
upon federal recognition, which is itself a benefit, not a treaty right. Conway. 286 F.3d at 
1203-1204; Menominee v. U.S., 391 U.S. at 412-413, 88 S.Ct. at 1711. 
The UPA makes no mention of treaty rights at all, and "[a]t the outset, we note that 
the 1954 Act does not contain provisions specifically treating the right to hunt and fish. 
We believe that proper construction of the 1954 Act compels the conclusion that the 
mixed-blood Ute Indians retained the right to hunt and fish on reservation land." Felter. 
752 F.2d at 1509. This is the effect, or rather lack of effect, of the UPA on hunting and 
fishing rights. 
It is also worth noting that the UPA, again by its own terms, was contingent upon a 
number of circumstances, including preparation of a distribution plan for the mixed-blood 
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group (25 U.S.C. §6771), preparation of a development plan for the full-blood group, and 
ultimate termination of the full-blood group. Inasmuch as none of these conditions was 
ever fulfilled, nor ever shall be, the UPA is void at the outset for failure of its essential 
conditions. 
2. The UPA specifically exempts indivisible assets from its operation. The relevant 
portions of the Ute Partition Act explicitly exempt indivisible assets of the Ute tribe from 
the effects of termination: 
Effective on the date of publication of the final rolls as provided in 
section 677g of this title the tribe thereafter shall consist exclusively of full-
blood members. Mixed-blood members shall have no interest therein except 
as otherwise provided in sections 617-677aa of this title. 
25 U.S.C. §677d (Emphasis added). The applicable provisions are as follows: 
The tribal business committee representing the full-blood group, and 
the authorized representatives of the mixed-blood group, within sixty days 
after the publication of the final membership roll, as provided in section 
677g of this title, shall commence a division of assets of the tribe that are 
then susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution, . . . All 
unadjudicated or unliquidated claims against the United States, all gas, oil, 
and mineral rights of every kind, and all other assets not susceptible to 
equitable and practicable distribution shall be managed jointly by the 
Tribal Business Committee and the authorized representatives of the mixed-
blood group, subject to such supervision by the Secretary as is otherwise 
required by law,. . . 
25 U.S.C. §677i (Emphasis added). 
When any mixed-blood member of the tribe has received his 
distributive share of the tribal assets distributed to the mixed-blood group 
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under the provisions of section 677i of this title, whether such distribution 
is made in part or in whole to a corporation, partnership, or trusteeship in 
which he is interested, or otherwise, the Secretary is authorized and 
directed to immediately transfer to him unrestricted control of all other 
property held in trust for such mixed-blood member by the United States, 
and shall further remove all restrictions on the sale or encumbrance of trust 
or restricted property owned by such member of the tribe, and Federal 
supervision of such member and his property shall thereby be terminated, 
except as to his remaining interest in tribal property in the form of my 
unadjudicated or unliquidated claims against the United States, all gas, oil, 
and mineral rights of every kind, and all other tribal assets not susceptible 
to equitable and practicable distribution, all of which shall remain subject 
to the terms of sections 677-677aa of this title, notwithstanding anything 
contained in said sections to the contrary. 
25 U.S.C. §677o(a). (Emphasis added). This provision exempts all assets not 
susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution from the effects of the termination 
statute. The final sentence excludes these assets from the definitive section of the UPA, 
which once again limits its effects to termination of federal benefits: 
Upon removal of Federal restrictions on the property of each 
individual mixed-blood member of the tribe, the Secretary shall publish in 
the Federal Register a proclamation declaring that the Federal trust 
relationship to such individual is terminated. Thereafter, such individual 
shall not be entitled to any of the services performed for Indians because of 
his status as an Indian. All statutes of the United States which affect Indians 
because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to such 
member over which supervision has been terminated, and the laws of the 
several States shall apply to such member in the same manner as they apply 
to other citizens within their jurisdiction. 
25 U.S.C. §677v. (Emphasis added). Thus, the UPA has no effect on assets not 
susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution and has no effect on treaty rights as 
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separate from federal benefits. 
3. Hunting and fishing rights are an indivisible asset. In a Memorandum dated May 
17, 1996, William R. McConkie, Acting Field Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, 
stated the following: 
[T]he Federal District Court for Utah, in a case dealing with the right of 
Mixed Bloods to hunt and fish on the Reservation, ruled that the terminated 
Mixed-Bloods as a group retained an in common property right in nondivisible 
assets of the Tribe. 
The mixed bloods retained interests in common with the tribal 
membership in oil, gas, and mineral resources of every kind, all 
unadjudicated or unliquidated claims against the United States, "and 
all other assets not susceptible to equitable and practicable 
distribution." 25 U.S.C. §677i. 
Unted States v. Felten 546 F.Supp. 1002, 1023 (D. Utah 1982). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and ruled "that the right to 
hunt and fish on the reservation is an "asset not susceptible to equitable and 
practicable distribution"' under the UPA. United States v. Felter. 752 F.2d 1505, 
1512 (10th Cir. 1985). Emphasis added. Thus the rulings on (1) minerals, and (2) 
hunting and fishing are each applicable to the other. Both assets are considered 
nondivisible tribal assets. 
[T]he Ute Termination Act . . . preserved individual rights to share in 
tribal property while otherwise altering or terminating the 
inchviduaFs relationship with the tribe It constrasts sharply with 
other legislation that expressly provided for complete severance of 
tribal relations to an individual.... While Congress may have the 
power to wholly partition the tribal estate . . . it must express its 
intent to do so in plain and unambiguous terms. 
45 
Felter, at 546 F. Supp. 1026, citations omitted. Emphasis added. See United State 
v. Felter. 752 F.2d 1505, 1508. The ownership of these assets are held in common 
today. Id. 
MIXED^BLOOD RETAIN TRIBAL STATUS AS REGARD NONDIVIDED ASSETS 
The Mixed-Bloods have not lost their status as tribal members as concerns 
those assets not susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution. 
The United States brought a misdemeanor action against a Mixed-Blood 
(Oranna Bumgarner Felter) on the theory that she had lost her status as an Indian 
by virtue of the Termination Proclamation issued by the Secretary of the Interior in 
August, 1961, alleging that she thereby lost her right to hunt and fish on 
Reservation lands. The United States Federal District Court for the District of Utah 
and the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals both ruled that the Mixed-
Blood members were terminated only as regards such property as was distributed 
to them. They were not terminated as regards such property as was not distributed 
to them. 
Federal supervision of mixed-blood members and their property was 
terminated, "except as to [their] remaining interest in . . . tribal 
assets not susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution/' [25 
U.S.C. §677i], §677o(a). 
United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505 (1985) at 1507. Emphasis added. To 
amplify this point the court referred to Section 5 of the UP A stating that after 
publication of the final rolls of Full-Bloods and Mixed-Bloods, "the tribe shall 
thereafter consist exclusively of Full-Blood members. Mixed-Blood members shall 
have no interest therein except as otherwise provided in the subchapter." The court 
held that the UPA did "otherwise" provide for a continued interest in assets not 
susceptible to equitable and practicable distribution. Id. Also, Id. at 1508. 
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The Federal District Court for Utah, in United States v. Felter. 546 F.Supp. 
1002 (1982), recognized that the tribal relationship of the mixed-bloods did not 
end at termination: 
While withdrawal from membership in the tribe would generally 
result in the extinguishment of all individual rights of user in tribal 
property, see 1 Opinions of the Solicitor of the Dep't of Interior 
Relating to Indian Affairs 811-812 (1979), the Ute Termination Act 
called at most for only an incomplete withdrawal from the rights of 
tribal membership. Section 677d of the Act provided that mixed-
blood members enrolled on the final mixed-blood roll "shall have no 
interest [in the Tribe] except as otherwise provided in section 677-
677aa of this title," i.e., the entire Ute Termination Act. 
Id, at 1023. Emphasis added. 
It is important to note that "termination" does not mean that 
someone's identity as an Indian is ended. Rather, what is terminated 
is (1) eligibility for federal services made available to those 
recognized as "Indian," and (2) the duties and powers invested in the 
United States regarding the management of their affairs, or their 
property. 
Id. at 1004. 
Nor is "termination" necessarily the end of tribal existence. Even 
when Congress has enacted legislation calling for the dissolution of 
specific tribes, something not done by the tennination acts, the 
continued existence of the tribes in spite of legislation has led to a 
continuation of the federal tribal relationship. If tribal existence is to 
end, it is for the Indians to end it. 
Id. Footnote 3, citations omitted. While individual Mixed-Blood members 
of the Tribe have lost eligibility for certain federal services, see e.g., Maldonado v. 
Hodei 683 F.Supp. 1322 (D.Utah 1988), nevertheless the Mixed-Blood group 
remains part of the Tribe for the very limited but specific purpose of managing 
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nondivisible tribal assets and enjoying the fruits thereof and of Reservation 
hunting and fishing. Also, the United States did not lose management of 
nondivisible property. United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1507. 
William R. McConkie, Acting Field Solicitor, Memorandum from United States 
Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, to U.S. Fish and Wildlife Management 
and Assistance Office. Re: Joint Management of Tribal Assets Not Susceptible to 
Equitable and Practicable Distribution, May 17, 1996, pages 6-9. 
4. The UPA confers no jurisdiction on the State over hunting and fishing on Indian 
lands. Under 25 U.S.C. §677i, all assets susceptible of equitable and practicable 
distribution shall be allocated as agreed between the Full-bloods and the Mixed-bloods, 
and all assets not so susceptible shall be managed jointly. Accordingly, on July 16,1958, 
the Ute Tribal Business Committee passed Resolution 58-163, which states in pertinent 
part: 
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE UINTAH AND OURAY TRIBAL 
BUSINESS COMMITTEE That the fish and game upon all lands to be 
received by the Mixed-Blood group pursuant to the agreed division, as 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall, from the date hereof, be 
under the management and control of the Mixed-Blood group exclusively 
and said Mixed-Blood group, should they so desire, may sell hunting and 
fishing permits or licenses and retain all funds derived therefrom without 
accounting to the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
The "Mixed-Blood group" has never surrendered this exclusive right to manage 
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and control 27% offish and game upon Indian lands, including the right to sell permits to 
non-Indians. Under §677i, this agreement remains valid and subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal government and the Full-blood and Mixed-blood members of 
the Tribe. As noted previously, 25 U.S.C. § 1321(b) provides that: 
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, 
or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, 
belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held 
in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation 
imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of 
such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, 
or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any 
Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege or 
immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect 
to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation 
thereof. (Emphasis added) 
Thus, as an indivisible asset over which the Tribe and the federal government 
retain exclusive control, the State cannot exercise jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on 
Indian lands. Indeed, the State cannot exercise any criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands 
except as such jurisdiction is conferred upon it in accordance with 25 U.S.C. §1321. 
Confronted with a similar assertion of state law in Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court noted 
that Arizona could not assert jurisdiction over Indian country inasmuch as the State 
constitution had not been amended to permit such jurisdiction and the affected Indians 
had not consented. McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona. 411 U.S. 164, 178-
179, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1265-66, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973). The court also noted that Utah's 
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constitution is subject to the identical provision. 411 U.S. at 175, n. 14, 93 S.Ct. at 1264 
n. 14. Indeed, the court has noted that Alaska and 13 other states are subject to the same 
provision. Metkalatka Indian Com.. Annette Islands Res, v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 58, 82 
S.Ct. 552, 561, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962). The 10th Circuit has likewise noted that, pursuant 
to 25 U.S.C. §1321, Utah has no jurisdiction. United States v. Felter. 752 F.2d 1505, 
1508 n.7 (10th Or. 1985). 
Tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing by non-members on Indian lands 
derives from the inherent authority of tribes to exclude non-members from Indian lands, 
to govern the tribes internal affairs, and to control hunting and fishing on the reservation. 
This includes the power to define who may enter the reservation, to define the conditions 
upon which they may enter, to prescribe rules of conduct, to expel those who enter the 
reservation without proper authority or those who violate relevant laws, and to refer those 
violate the laws to the appropriate officials. Ouechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe. 531 F.2d 
408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976). To the extent tribal courts lack authority to prosecute non-
members, 18 U.S.C. §1165 was specifically enacted to protect the right of tribes to 
control hunting and fishing on tribal lands. United States v. Finch. 548 F.2d 822, 834 (9th 
Cir. 1976), United States v. Felter. 752 F.2d 1505, 1512, n. 11 (10th Cir. 1985). 
On September 11, 2000, the Ute Tribe enacted tribal Ordinance 00-001 to regulate 
the very conduct at issue. Where a tribe has undertaken to regulate hunting and fishing by 
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non-members on tribal lands in conjunction with federal law, state jurisdiction is pre-
empted. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. N.C. Wildlife. 588 F.2& 75, 78 (4th Cir. 
1978). This is particularly so where a federal statute, such as §677i, reserves regulation of 
hunting and fishing to the tribe and the Secretary of the Interior. Metkalatka v. Egan, 
supra; Mescalero Apache Tribe v. State of New Mexico. 630 F.2d 724, (10th Cir. 1980). 
In summary, any issue of jurisdiction over the Defendant is between the Ute Tribe 
and the federal government. There is simply no provision for State jurisdiction within 
Indian country as it has been defined by the UP A, by the U.S. Supreme Court, and by the 
10th Circuit. See Ute Tribe v. Utah. 114 F.3d at 1517. 
5. Termination cannot be imputed to persons not included on the termination roll. 
As noted before, the Defendant's father, Rickie Reber, was bom prior to enactment of the 
UFA. At the time of his birth, he was eligible for enrollment in the Ute Tribe, and 
possessed all of the rights incident to that eligibility, including hunting and fishing rights. 
When Mr. Reber two, the roll of Mixed-Blood members was compiled in accordance 
with the Act of August 27, 1954. However, Rick Reber was never included on the roll. In 
a Memorandum dated September 21, 1955, the solicitor for the Department of the Interior 
indicated that the Secretary of the Interior did not possess any authority under the UPA to 
transfer minor children onto the Mixed-blood roll: 
You have requested my opinion on the power of the Secretary to 
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transfer a minor from the proposed full-blood roll to the mixed-blood roll 
upon application of the parent for himself and his minor children, pursuant 
to section 4 of the Act of August 27, 1954, Public Law 671-83rd Congress 
(68Stat. 868). [25 U.S.C. 677c]. 
Section 4 states that any member of the tribe whose name appears on 
the proposed roll of full-blood members may apply to the Superintendent to 
become identified with and part of the mixed-blood roll provided that 
before such transfer is made the Secretary shall first certify that in his 
opinion such change in status is not detrimental to the best interests of the 
applicant. The provisions of the Act are silent with respect to the transfer of 
a minor to the mixed-blood roll. In this regard it differs from the Klamath 
Withdrawal Act of August 13, 1954 (68 Stat 718) which specifically gives 
the head of the family the right to file for himself and his minor children an 
election to withdraw from the tribe. 
Section 22 provides for the protection by the Secretary of the rights 
of minors and other members of the tribe in need of assistance and, further, 
that the appointment of guardians pursuant to State law will not be required 
until Federal supervision has terminated. The indications of this section and 
other provisions of the Act are that this protection was intended for the 
benefit of members of the mixed-blood roll. The restrictions on their trust 
and redestricted property are to terminate in accordance with Section 16 
and the assets of the mixed-blood group are to be distributed to the 
individual members under Section 13. 
It was apparent that the Act would result in some members of a 
family being placed on the full-blood roll and others on the mixed-blood 
roll. If it were contemplated that the integrity of the family was to be 
maintained with respect to their membership some provision it seems would 
have at least been made allowing members of a family to transfer from the 
mixed-blood roll to the full-blood roll. An examination of the legislative 
history of the Act is of no aid on the question posed. In the absence of any 
express language in the Act or Congressional intent shown in its legislative 
history it must be concluded that the Secretary does not have such power, 
particularly when a transfer of a minor from the full-blood to the mixed-
blood roll would result in the taxation and removal of restrictions on his 
trust and restricted property and in loss of the right in Section 23 to share in 
Federal services available to Indians because of their status as Indians. 
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J. Reuel Armstrong, Solicitor, Memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 
Re: Interpretation of Section 4 of the Act of August 27. 1954 (68 Stat. 868), M-36305, 
September 21, 1955. This statement is consistent with the well established canon of 
construction that all ambiguous provisions in a treaty or act of Congress are to be 
construed in favor of the Indians, and a treaty or act cannot deprive Indians of their rights 
unless it is explicit in its intent to do so. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 
U.S. 226, 105 S.Ct 1245, 1258-59, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985). 
We believe the canon of statutory construction cited by the 
Government requires us to conclude that, because the 1954 Act is silent on 
the issue of whether the mixed-blood Ute Indians retained the right to hunt 
and fish on the reservation, we should not impute an intent on the part of 
Congress to abrogate this right of the mixed-blood Ute Indians. This 
"eminently sound and vital canon" of construction, Northern Cheyenne 
Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7, 96 S.Ct. 1793, 1797 n. 7, 48 
L.Ed.2d 274 (1976), provides that "statutes passed for the benefit of 
dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful 
expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians." Alaska Pacific 
Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89, 39 S.Ct. 40, 42, 63 L.Ed. 
138 (1918); see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392, 96 S.Ct. 
2102, 2112,48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 
199-200, 95 S.Ct. 944, 948, 43 L.Ed.2d 129 (1975); see generally R 
Cohen, {Handbook of Federal Indian Law] at 221-25. 
Feher, 752 F.2d at 1511. See also Id. at 1510, n. 8. Just as there is no provision in 
the UP A for terminating the hunting and fishing rights of persons included on the mixed-
blood roll, so likewise there is no provision in the UPA whatsoever for terminating the 
rights of persons born prior to termination whose names were not included on the roll. 
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Colton's father possesses just as many rights today as he did at birth, and the State has no 
jurisdiction to interfere with those rights nor those of his children. 
6. The UPA has no effect on the separate assets of the Uintah Band. All hunting 
rights on Indian lands within the reservation derive from those of the Uintah Band, 
inasmuch as the Indians of Utah Territory are the only Indians having aboriginal rights on 
the reservation, and the Indians of Utah are only associated with the Uintah Band. The 
creation of the Ute Indian Tribe in 1937 did not alter this. Article VI, Section 4, of the 
Ute Tribal Constitution states: "Any rights and powers heretofore vested in the Tribe or 
bands of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation but not expressly referred to in this 
Constitution shall not be abridged by this article." The hunting and fishing rights of the 
Uintah band thus remain separate and distinct from those of the Ute Tribe. 
The 10th Circuit has acknowledged that water rights appurtenant to Indian lands on 
the reservation, whether derived from the Uintah Band or the Ute Tribe, are valid, and 
have a priority date of October 3, 1861. Hackford v. Babbitt 14 F.3d at 1469. The rights 
of the Uintah Band, as separate from the Ute Tribe are thus apparent, inasmuch as the 
Indians of Utah associated with the Uintah Band are the only Indians to whom the Act of 
1861 applies. The Ute Indian Tribe, consisting of the Uintah, Whiteriver, and Uncompah-
gre bands, did not exist in 1861 and did not come into existence until January 19, 1937. 
The hunting and fishing rights of the Uintah Band, no less than the water rights, 
54 
remain unaffected by the UP A, inasmuch as the UPA only presumed to end federal 
supervision over the common assets of the Ute Tribe, not over the separate rights and 
assets of the constituent bands. Colton has a right of user in those rights, just as Mr. 
Hackford has a right of user in the water rights of the Uintah Band. Hackford v. Babbitt. 
14F.3datl467. 
In Fejter, the 10th Circuit found that the defendant definitely possessed the right to 
hunt and fish in Indian country prior to enactment of the partition act. As a result, she had 
a tribal right of user that could not be deprived by termination. 752 F.2d at 1509-1510. 
Rick Reber possessed the identical right of user at birth, with the added distinction that, 
unlike Ms. Felter, he was never included on the termination rolls. The Defendant is not 
claiming an inheritable right. He is claiming his own rights as an Indian of Utah Territory. 
It is well-established that an act cannot deprive Indians of vested treaty rights absent an 
express intention to do so. U.S. v. Felter. 752 F.2d 1505, 1511, 1512 (10th Or. 1985). The 
Partition Act does not express any intention to terminate anyone other than those Indians 
included on the mixed-blood rolls. Neither the Defendants nor their pre-born parents 
were on that roll, and therefore they retain all rights of the Uintah Band, including the 
right to hunt and fish on Indian lands. 
7. The trial court has no jurisdiction to interpret the UPA.. The Ute Partition Act is 
a federal act pertaining to federally protected rights on federal land. The Act does not 
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confer jurisdiction on any other court, either State or tribal, to interpret or enforce its 
provisions. Affiliated Ute Citizens, et al. v. Ute Indian Tribe. Civil No. 89-C-982G 
(D.Utah)(Order of September 4,1990, page 4). Accordingly, the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to extend the operation of the UP A to persons bom prior to the UP A but not 
included on the termination roll. Nor did the court have any jurisdiction to apply the 
terms of the UPA to the independent rights of the Uintah Band. 
8. The UPA is unconstitutional. By its literal terms, the Ute Partition Act imposed 
termination on the basis of Indian blood quantum. In practice, termination was 
intentionally based on Uintah tribal status, a basis equally unjustifiable as public policy 
even at that time, as well as upon other factors left entirely unstated in the Act itself, and 
entirely contrary to Indian custom and culture. Many Indians who remained enrolled in 
the Ute Tribe, both in 1954 and today, do not have any more Indian blood than do those 
who were terminated. 
a. The UPA violates the Equal Protection clause of the XIVth Amendment. The 
XIV11 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Section 1, states in pertinent part: "No State 
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
Under this clause, any legal distinctions based on race are subject to strict scrutiny. 
Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S, 200, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 
(1995). Although Indians constitute a distinct racial group, this clause is generally 
56 
inapplicable to Indian law for the reasons stated previously in regard to each tribe's right 
to determine its own membership criteria. (See Section I.C.5, supra, Indian tribes 
determine their own membership criteria.) 
The Ute Partition Act constitutes a dramatic exception to this rule. During the 
termination era, all other tribes subjected to termination were done so as a whole. This 
practice was not inconsistent with the concept of tribes as political rather than racial 
entities. The UPA is unique in this respect, in that it first divided the tribe along racial 
lines. This utterly belies the concept of tribes as political rather than racial entities, and 
places the UPA squarely in violation of the XIVth Amendment. As such> it is completely 
void. 118-154 
b. The UPA is a covert attempt to eliminate all Indian rights in the Uintah Basin. 
The UPA's division of the Indians along racial lines raises serious questions in its 
own right. However, actual termination was based on factors more devious in their intent, 
specifically calculated to undercut the entire existence of the reservation. These factors 
included: Descent from Utah rather than Colorado Indians; Shoshone rather than Ute 
blood; Membership in the Uintah Band; and Matrilineal descent. 
i. Descent from Utah rather than Colorado Indians. The Indians of Utah Territory 
associated with the Uintah Band are the only Indians who have any aboriginal, 
recognized, or priority claim to the lands of the Uinta Valley. The White River and 
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Uncompahgre Bands do not have any aboriginal claim to any lands in Utah, having 
relinquished all claims upon their expulsion from Colorado, Thus, if the free Uintahs 
could be terminated as Indians, nobody would have any aboriginal, recognized, or 
priority claim to any property or sovereign rights within the Uinta Valley, As a result, all 
Indians would be divested of any federal protection and the Uinta Valley Reservation 
would cease to exist. This outcome has been repeatedly sought by the State of Utah. Ute 
Indian Tribe v. Utak 935 F. Supp. at 1487. 
However, notwithstanding the Uintahs were terminated as Utes, they have never 
been terminated as Indians of Utah Territory, as Shoshone Indians, nor as members of the 
Uintah Band. Thus, the reservation remains Indian country. 
ii Shoshone rather than Ute blood. By emphasizing Ute blood, the Shoshone 
Indians of Utah Territory constituting the Uintah Band could be terminated under the Ute 
Partition Act, but only as Utes, not as Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory. The fact that 
the Indians of Utah Territory who were members of the Uintah Band were Shoshone 
emphasizes that the rights of the Uintah Band are separate and distinct from those of the 
White Rivers and the Uncompahgre Utes. 
iii. Membership in the Uintah Band. Prior to 1937, and subsequent to 1954, the 
Uintah Band have been a separate people, possessing separate rights. They surrendered 
none of these things by becoming part of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
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Reservation in 1937, and they lost none of these rights by being expelled from that 
organization in 1954. 
A minority cannot dictate to a majority, and a separate tribe cannot dictate 
membership requirements to another tribe. 208 people cannot vote 456 people out of a 
tribe, the White River and Uncompahgre Bands cannot tell the Uintah Band who can or 
cannot be a Uintah, and Utes cannot tell Shoshones who is or is not Shoshone. 
iv. Matrilineal descent. For the most part, only Indians having non-Indian 
surnames were terminated from the Ute Tribe. Persons with Indian surnames remained on 
the Ute tribal rolls. In other words, only persons deriving their Indian status, rights, and 
culture through matrilineal descent were terminated. Persons deriving their Indian status 
through patrilinial descent remained on the Ute rolls, regardless of blood quantum. 
Ironically, in both Ute and Shoshone cultures, Indian heritage is reckoned predominantly 
through matriarchal, not patriarchal succession. Patriarchal succession is a characteristic 
not of Indian culture, but of the predominant white socio-economic group inhabiting the 
State of Utah. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was enacted to counteract precisely 
such destruction of Indian cultural values and family connections. 25 U.S.C. §1901. 
It is arguable that Congress has the power to wipe out all rights of the Uintah 
Band, and thereby the rights of all Indians in the Uintah Basin. Such an intent would be 
reprehensible, but is nevertheless within the powers assumed by Congress. Nevertheless, 
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the law is unequivocal that such an intent must be expressed clearly and explicitly. While 
the intent behind the 1954 Act has been clearly manifest in its execution, that intent is 
anything but clear or explicit in the Act itself. Because the intent to eliminate the Uintah 
Band is not so stated in the Act, the Act could do nothing more than expel the Uintah 
Band from the Ute Tribe. Inasmuch as the 1954 Act made no mention whatsoever of the 
pre-existing rights of the Indians of Utah Territory, of Shoshone Indians, nor of the 
Uintah Band, it can have no effect on rights deriving from those sources. 
II. Colton Reber cannot be held culpable for the offense charged. 
A. The Defendant cannot be held liable for acting at the direction of his father. 
There is no question that at the time of the alleged offense, Colton was acting at 
the direct instruction of his father. While numerous cases address the liability of an adult 
who directs a child to commit an allegedly criminal act, they are not relevant at this point, 
inasmuch as Colton's father is, in fact, being prosecuted for the alleged offense as well. 
While far more rarely addressed, a child cannot be held culpable who was acting at the 
direction of an adult. Commonwealth v. Mead. 10 Allen (92 Mass.) 398, 399-400 (1865); 
McClure v. Com.. 81 Ky. 448, 451 (1883). 
In addition, both Colton and his father were acting in reliance upon rulings of the 
10* U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Tribe v. Utah, and Conwav. As noted above, the 
10th Circuit's ruling in Ute Tribe v. Utah defined the location of the alleged offense as 
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Indian country. The 10th Circuit's ruling in Conway held, as a matter of law, that if the 
facts were proven to be as alleged in the complaint in that action, the Indians of Utah 
Territory would retain the right to hunt and fish on Indian lands. 
Colton and his father were also relying upon a proclamation of the Ute Tribe. 
Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §677i, on July 16, 1958, the Ute Tribal Business Committee passed 
Resolution 58-163, which states in pertinent part: 
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE UINTAH AND OURAY TRIBAL 
BUSINESS COMMITTEE That the fish and game upon all lands to be 
received by the Mixed-Blood group pursuant to the agreed division, as 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall, from the date hereof, be 
under the management and control of the Mixed-Blood group exclusively 
and said Mixed-Blood group, should they so desire, may sell hunting and 
fishing permits or licenses and retain all funds derived therefrom without 
accounting to the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
U.C.A. §76-2-306 states in pertinent part: 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a 
penal law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably 
believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's 
reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a 
written order or grant of permission by an administrative 
agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the 
law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an 
opinion of a court of record or made by a public servant 
charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in 
question. 
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The defense of mistake of law is based on the due process clause contained in the 
Vth and XIVth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 
85 S.Ct. 476, 484, 13 L.Ed. 487 (1965); Bouie v. City of Columbia. 378 U.S. 347, 354, 
84 S.Ct. 1697, 1703, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). The right to due process of law includes the 
right to reasonably rely upon a published interpretation of the law. United States v. 
Caceres. 440 U.S. 741, 753 n.15, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 1472 n. 15, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979). This 
specifically includes the right to rely on rulings issued by the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals. United States v. Peltier. 422 U.S. 531, 541-542, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2319-2320,45 
L.Ed.2d 374 (1975). "Unless we are to hold that parties may not reasonably rely upon any 
legal pronouncement emanating from sources other than this Court, we cannot regard as 
blameworthy those parties who conform their conduct to the prevailing [federal] statutory 
or constitutional norm." Id. 
Likewise, under Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution, defendants are entitled to 
present evidence of the interpretation of the law they have relied upon. South Salt Lake 
City v. Terkelson. 61 P.3d 282, 285 (Utah App. 2002). Under Utah law, mis is so even if 
the interpretation they have relied upon is not binding upon the court. It is a denial of 
Due Process to prevent defendants from presenting such evidence, particular if that 
interpretation was in the form of a judicial ruling. 61 P.3d at 286. See also United States 
v- Bradv. 710 F.Supp. 290, 294-295 (D.Colo. 1989). The defense of mistake of law is 
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based on fundamental fairness. Kipp v. State. 704 A.2d 839, 843 (Del. 1998). 
The two rulings of the 10th Circuit constitute "a written interpretation of the law 
contained in an opinion of a court of record." The proclamation by the Ute Tribe 
Business Committee constitutes "an official statement of the law contained in a written 
order or grant of permission by an adniinistrative agency charged by law [in the view of 
the State of Utah] with responsibility for interpreting the law in question." Colton cannot 
now be held criminally culpable when he relied in good faith upon his father, the 10th 
Circuit, the Ute Tribe Business Committee, and his own tribe's elders' assurances that the 
conduct in question is not criminal. 
B. The Defendant is presumed incompetent to commit a crime unless proven 
otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. 
U.C.A. §76-2-301 states: 
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed before 
he reaches the age of fourteen years. This section shall in no way limit the 
jurisdiction or proceedings before the juvenile courts of this state. 
This section incorporates the common law rule of infancy, which holds that a child 
is incapable of committing a crime up to the age of 7, and is thereafter presumed 
incapable of committing a crime until the age of 14, unless the presumption is rebutted by 
the state by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile 
Court. Andrew Walkover, 31 U.C.L.A. 503, 504 (1984). See also Chatwin v. United 
63 
States. 326 U.S. 455, 461, 66 S.Ct. 233,236, 90 L.Ed. 198, 201 (1946)(Infancy defense 
applicable in Utah); 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 23, 24 (1800). 
Colton is alleged to have committed the offense on October 27,2002. As set forth 
in the petition, he did not turn 14 until December 30, 2002. He thus falls within the scope 
of U.C.A. §76-2-301 and is presumed incompetent to be convicted. The State cannot 
convict him without overcoming this presumption beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Monahait 15 N J. 34, 104 A.2d 21, 29 (1954). In light of Colton's reliance upon his 
father, upon the rulings of the 10th Circuit, upon the proclamations of the Ute Tribe, and 
upon the tribal elders of the Uintah Band, the State never met this burden, and the 
conviction must be vacated. 
IIL UX.A. §78-3a-117(4) is unconstitutional. 
Although juveniles are denied the foil range of constitutional due process 
protections guaranteed to adults under the Vth and XTV* Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution, they must nevertheless be provided with some degree of due process. In re: 
Gault 387 U.S. 1, 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); InreA.CXL 2 P.3d 
464, 469 (Utah App. 2000). Unfortunately, the statute under which the State is 
proceeding denies even this minimum protection. U.C.A. §78-3a-117(4) states in 
pertinent part: 
An adjudication by a juvenile court that a minor is within its 
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jurisdiction under Section 78-3a-104 is considered a conviction for 
purposes of determining the level of the offense for which a juvenile may 
be charged and enhancing the level of an offense in the juvenile court. 
Under this section, a finding by the Court either that the Indians of Utah Tenitory 
do not possess the right to hunt and fish on Indian lands, or that Colton Reber is not an 
Indian of Utah Territory, or that he was not hunting on Indian lands, would automatically 
constitute a conviction, without requiring the Court to ever address whether Colton 
actually shot the elk in question. While the state and federal courts grant the juvenile 
courts enormous latitude to restict or deny due process, they do not go so far as to permit 
the courts to enter a conviction solely on the basis of jurisdiction, without some factual 
finding connecting the accused with the crime. On its face, U.C.A. §78-3a-117(4) denies 
even this minimum of due process, which is required by Article L, Section 7, of the Utah 
Constitution, as well as by the Vth and XIVth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
Even if U.C.A. §78-3a-117(4) were applicable in cases where State jurisdiction 
hasn't been called into question, it cannot be applied in a case such as this, where the 
State's jurisdiction over the accused, its jurisdiction over the site of the alleged conduct, 
or even its jurisdiction to define the conduct as a crime, has been placed in issue entirely 
separately from whether or not the accused actually committed the act in question. 
U.C.A. §78-3a-117(4) is uncontitutional both on its face, and as applied, and the action 
must therefore be dismissed. 
65 
CONCLUSION 
The law is clear that, once challenged, the burden is upon the State to establish 
jurisdiction. The law is equally clear that Federal jurisdiction over Indians within Indian 
country is exclusive. In order for hie State to establish jurisdiction over Colton Reber, the 
State would have to show (1) that those rights reserved under the Executive Order of 
October 3, 1861, and die Act of May 5, 1864, have somehow been abrogated by treaty or 
Act of Congress, (2) that Colton is not a party entitled to claim any rights reserved under 
the Order of 1861 or the Act of 1864, or (3) that Colton was not in Indian country. 
Inasmuch as the State failed to provide evidence of any of these factors, it failed to 
overcome Colton's prima facie showing mat the State lacks jurisdiction, and the 
conviction should be vacated. 
Colton's right to hunt and fish in Indian country is a treaty right belonging to the 
Indians of Utah Territory, a distinct body recognized by the federal government as 
associated with the Uintah Band. Colton is recognized as an Indian by that band by tribal 
kinship, thus rendering all further questions of blood quantum moot. His rights do not 
derive from the Ute Tribe, but exist independently of tiiat tribe, and thus cannot be 
controlled or terminated by the Ute Tribe. The State lacks jurisdiction to charge a 
federally protected treaty right as an offense, and the action must therefore be vacated. 
At the time of the alleged offense, Colton was acting at the direction of his father. 
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Both he and his father were acting in good faith reliance upon the rulings of the 10th 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah and Timpanogos Tribe v. Conwav. 
Even if the State had jurisdiction over the alleged offense, convicting Colton for acting at 
the direction of his father and in reasonable reliance upon a published court ruling would 
violate his right to Due Process of Law as guaranteed under the Vth and XIVth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution. 
Indeed, inasmuch as U.C.A. §78-3a-117(4) equates jurisdiction with conviction, without 
any further process, that section likewise denies Due Process of Law, in violation of the 
V* and XIVth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the Utah 
Constitution. For all of the foregoing reasons, Colton Reber's conviction should be 
vacated and the matter dismissed. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2005. 
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STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
COLTONREBER 
DOB: 12/30/88 
Person(s) under eighteen years of age 
ORDER 
CaseNumbei: 170075 
Judge Larry A. Steele 
This matter came before the Juvenile Court on the Minor's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. In 
support of the minor's motion, the minor has filed extensive memoranda. In addition, the issues raised by the 
minor have been extensively briefed and argued in the Eighth District Court in the parallel matter of the minor's 
father who was charged with aiding and abetting the minor in the commission of the same offense. In response 
to the minor's motion, the State has filed a memorandum and copies of the extensive briefs filed in and the 
rulings filed by the District Court. After reviewing the new material filed by the minor and the pleadings and 
rulings from the District Court matter, the Court is ready to rule. 
The State bears the burden of showing that the offense occurred within the boundaries of the State of Utah and 
Uintah County, the minor has the burden to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that he is an "Indian" under 
the Rogers test. One of the primary differences between this matter and the matter of the father in the District 
Court is the degree to which the minor may have Indian blood. The father having 1/16 Indian blood through his 
mother and no Indian blood through his father, the minor would have 1/32 Indian blood, not a sufficient degree 
to make the minor an "Indian" for the purposes of jurisdiction. As ruled by the District Court and considering 
the minor's status, the area in question is not within an area over which the Federal Government has exclusive 
jurisdiction. The Court does not accept the minor's arguments on competence, mistake and other arguments as 
a basis for lack of jurisdiction. 
IT IS HEREBY THE ORDER that the minor's Motion to Dismiss for Lack ol 
matter shall proceed to trial as scheduled. 
r'un: I it HI u. denied. The 
Filed: miroln 1,7-0^4 
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STATE OF UTAH in the mteiest of 
COLTON RCBER 
DOB 07/07/2007 
Peison(s) undei eighteen \eais of age 
ORDER 
Case Numbei 170075 
This mattei came befoie the Couit foi Tnal on the above mattei this 15n day of March 2004 Present 
was the alxne minoi his fathei mot^ei and counsel Mi Mike Hummiston, Mi Ed Peterson, Deput) County 
Attoine\ and a numbei of witnesses and spectatois 
Ed Johnson Officei Teiry Smith and Johnny Rebel were called as witnesses 
The minoi lenewed his objection to the junsdiction of this Couit 1 he issue of junsdiction has been 
pieviousl) mled upon 
The minoi objected to the amended mfoimation The information was amended to include that the 
animal was a tioph) animal because the lack was ovei 24 inches The Court invited the minoi to demonstrate 
wheiem he would be piejudiced by the amendment He had notice of the statutory piovision cited m the prior 
Information The deer antlers weie available foi examination by the minoi and counsel Counsel had even 
stipulated to the width of the antlers being gi eater than 24 inches The Couit found there was no piejudice m 
pioceedmg with the amended Information 
The Couit offeied to furthei consider any piejudice which the minor may identify duimg the trial and 
leconsider the motion oi bifurcate the pioceedmgs and give the minor additional time to prepaie to present any 
additional evidence or matters After the tnal began, theie was no discussion of furthei piejudice and no lequest 
to bifmcate oi foi additional time to piesent fuithei evidence or matters 
Having heard such oral testimony as the paities chose to mtioduce examined the exhibits, heard oral 
argument, the Couit makes the following findings, based on the credible evidence and the reasonable inferences 
to be diawn therefrom The Couit makes each of these findings beyond a reasonable doubt 
On oi about October 27 2004, Ed lohnson a biologist of 17 yeais foi the State of Utah, Division of 
Wildlife Resomces was doing a chronic wasting disease study for deei at Duck Rock which is at the end of the 
pavement at the south end of Bonanza Highway within Uintah County A gieen Chevrolet or GMC pickup with 
icense # 47'WFN stopped and the occupants spoke to him In the back of the vehicle was a buck Mule deer 
which had laige 3 point antleis Mr lohnson was famihai with Utah game licenses and tags This deer did not 
lave a tag oi peimit Mr lohnson asked the vehicle to follow him into the Vernal office of Wildlife Resouice 
Services He met up with Officei Teiry Smith at the intersection of Highway 40 and the R 
/ildhfe Resources and has been an officei for 16 years. 
Officei Smith took custody of the deer, removed and put an evidence tag on the antlers, which antlers 
ave been in his continuous custody 01 in evidence lockers under his control ever since October 27, 2002. The 
ntlers were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. The parties stipulated a photograph shall be substituted for the 
ntlers. The parties stipulated that the tfcantlers which were attached to the buck mule deer taken by Officer 
^erry Smith from the vehicle in which the Defendant was an occupant on the 27lh day of October 2002 have an 
mtside antler measurement of 24 and 3/4 inches." Mule deer such as the one taken are protected wildlife. A 
leer, such as this one, having a rack over 24 inches wide is a trophy animal. 
After arriving at the vernal office, Officer Smith spoke to all occupants of the green pickup. Colton 
Reber; his father. Rickie Reber: his uncle, Johnny Reber; and Johnny's grandson, Quintin Huber. Colton stated 
to Officer Smith that this was his first deer. Officer Smith did not include this admission in his report. Mr. 
Rickie Reber stated that his son, Colton, had shot the deer at about 5:00 PM that day. The father stated that the 
deer was killed just east of Bitter Creek and the King's Well Road. Mr. Reber stated to Officer Smith that he 
and his son had gone out hunting and his son. Colton, had killed his first deer. He was out there to assist Colton 
hunt and was in the process of transporting the deer back to his brother's house. They were in his brother's 
truck. 
The conversation with Mr. Reber and son. Colton. took place approximately 8:00 PM in the evening on 
October 27. 2002. The condition of the deer was consistent with the time of the kill and was consistent with the 
manner in which Mr. Reber indicated the deer had been killed. Officer Smith is familiar with the boundaries of 
Uintah County within the State of Utah and the area just east of Bitter Creek on King's Well Road is within 
Uintah County. Officer Smith is familiar with the road all the way to Duck Rock (15-20 miles) all of which is 
within Uintah County. 
The hunters were not "100% sure'" if they were legal or not, but argued that they had a right to hunt 
there. They did not have a Utah permit. They did present a paper which said "Timpanogas Tribe Subsistence 
Hunt 2002". The hunters stated they were members of the Timpanogas Tribe. 
The uncle, Johnny Reber, was present during the hunt, but did not have Colton and Rickie always in 
sight. He did not see Colton shoot the deer, but when he caught up with Colton and Rickie, they had the deer 
and there was blood on Colton and Rickie from cleaning and transporting the deer. 
The State asked the Court to make findings required by Utah vs. Payne, 892 Pd 1032 (Utah 1995). The 
offense occurred within the exterior boundaries of the State of Utah. The offense occurred within Uintah 
County. The offense and required elements of the offense occurred outside the boundaries of the Ute Indian 
reservation and any other Indian reservation. As previously ruled, the minor would have 1/32 Indian blood, not 
a sufficient degree to make the minor an "Indian" for the purposes of jurisdiction. The area in question is not 
within an area over which an Indian tribe or the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction. The area in 
question is an area over which the State of Utah has jurisdiction. 
The evidence was, for the most part, un-rebutted. The testimony of Johnny was presented and was 
argued by minor's counsel to raise a question as to who killed the deer. The testimony that Johnny did not keep 
Colton in sight and never saw Colton kill the deer, does little to rebut other evidence that Colton did kill the 
deer. Johnny also testified that when he returned to the father and Colton, they had the deer and had blood on 
them. The Court credits the testimony of Ed Johnson and Officer Terry Smith. In evaluating their testimony, 







~ -fotiw'Q admission. It appears to have been generally accepted, 
The above minor. Colton Reber, on or about the 27th day of October 2002. in Uintah County. State of 
Utah, did commit Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, an act in violation of UCA §23-20-4 and Section 
23-20-3(1). a third degree felony, by shooting, injuring, killing, taking, possessing and transporting protected 
wildlife. Colton possessed protected wildlife unaccompanied by a valid license, permit, tag. certificate of 
registration, bill of sale, or invoice. Colton did so with intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. It was 
ColtoiTs conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct and cause the result. It was his first deer. The 
protected wildlife, the deer, which was captured, injured or destroyed was a trophy animal. 
The parties disagreed on the degree to which the minor must know of the wrongfulness of his conduct to 
form the requisite intent. Nothing in the definition of "willful" requires scienter. Willful, when applied to the 
intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies a willingness to commit the act. It does not require an intent 
to violate the law or to injure another or acquire any advantage. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 
When more is required, the legislature so states, for example: 
UCA 23-20-27. Alteration of license, permit, tag or certificate a misdemeanor. 
Any person who at any time alters or changes in any maimer, with intent to defraud, any license, 
permit, tag or certificate of registration issued under provisions of this code or action of the 
Wildlife Board is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the minor did commit wanton destruction of protected and 
trophy wildlife in violation of UCA §23-20-4 and Section 23-20-3(1). a third degree felony. The disposition or 
sentencing will be stayed for a period of thirty (30) days within which time the minor may file a written notice 
of appeal. If appealed, the disposition will be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. If the matter is not 
appealed, a dispositional hearing shall be set after thirty (30) days has elapsed. This matter was transferred to 
the Eighth District Juvenile Court for "adjudication and disposition". If and when appropriate, disposition will 
occur in the Eighth District rather than in the First District Juvenile Court. 
Dated: w* - °1 
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